Authoritarianism and Globalization in Historical Perspective by Pinto, Pedro Ramos
 1 
Authoritarianism and Globalization  
in Historical Perspective 
Published in APSA-Comparative Democratization Newsletter, Vol.13, No.2 (2015) 
http://www.ned.org/apsa-cd/APSA-CD%20June%202015.pdf  
Pre-publication proof 
 
 
Pedro Ramos Pinto 
University of Cambridge 
Faculty of History and Trinity Hall 
pr211@cam.ac.uk  
 
For historians, just as much as for political scientists, the concept of authoritarianism 
is deeply bound up with the related ideas of democracy and, in particular, 20th century 
totalitarianism. In political science this has often evolved into debates over 
classification, e.g. what regimes were truly “totalitarian” or truly “fascist”. Yet, while 
issues of taxonomy are important when comparing nations quantitatively and 
synchronically, they become less salient when considering dynamics of change over 
time. Thinking historically about the relationship between authoritarianism and 
globalization, our attention is drawn away from fixed definitions and towards the 
ways in which regimes secure their authority over time. The way in which they do so 
develops in response to changing internal and external contexts and challenges, not 
least that of globalization. The idea of globalization has also been embraced by 
historians in recent years, but in ways that emphasize the evolving nature of 
transnational forces, linkages and flows since (at least) the last five centuries when 
not one, but several “globalizations” and “de-globalizations” are deemed to have 
taken place.1 
 
                                                       
1 Emma Rothschild, "Globalization and the Return of History." Foreign Policy (1999): 106-116; David 
Armitage, "Is There a Prehistory of Globalization?." In Deborah Cohen, and Maura O'Connor (eds) 
Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective (2004); Christopher Bayly The Birth 
of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (2003); Christopher Bayly. "From archaic globalization to 
international networks, circa 1600–2000." Interactions: transregional perspectives on world history 
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This piece approaches these topics from the perspective of an historian – by focusing 
on processes of change – and in relation to two important but neglected dimensions: 
the engagement of authoritarian regimes in international systems, and the interaction 
between authoritarianism and global population movements.  
 
In meeting the challenges of these transnational processes, the nature of regimes is 
necessarily transformed. Authoritarian regimes are successful first and foremost 
because they evolve. To capture these dynamics it is necessary to have more fine-
grained tools than the binaries of authoritarian-non-authoritarian allow for, tools 
capable of taking change into account even as regimes continue to retain their 
essential authoritarian nature. 
 
Thinking historically about globalization also directs our attention to the shifting 
position of nations in a global system and the changing nature of the flows and 
interactions between them, so that we can say that global processes affect states 
differentially according to their location: migration, for instance, raises distinct 
challenges for labor-exporting countries and for those which are importers of labor, as 
discussed below.  Equally, challenges facing regimes differ according to their place in 
broader geo-strategic systems such as the global Cold War—Cuba’s relationship to 
the USSR was naturally distinct from that of Albania’s. The variability across time 
and space of the influence of a particular type of globalization on any regime, 
authoritarian included, means that their responses will be equally diverse.  
 
Highlighting issues of change, variability, and the importance of context are some of 
the means by which historians can contribute to the way the social sciences engage 
with the more abstract concepts of authoritarianism and globalization.2 Yet, the 
historical perspective’s ambition to map the particular and historians’ aversion to 
generalization can, if taken to an extreme, result in the kind of project satirized in 
Umberto Eco’s essay on the difficulties of creating a 1:1 map of the world.  
 
                                                       
2 For a lucid statement of the importance of the historical perspective to understand contemporary 
global processes, including in the ways highlighted here, see Michael Woolcock, Simon Szreter, and 
Vijayendra Rao. "How and why does history matter for development policy?." The Journal of 
Development Studies 47.1 (2011): 70-96. 
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Focusing on what regimes do, rather than what they are is a way out of this problem 
of perspective, allowing us to relate the ideal types of political science to the critical 
issue of change dear to historians. Historical sociologists, more than historians tout-
court, have been particularly attentive to the historicity of regime forms. While 
Barrington Moore’s foundational work in this area focused more on the origins of 
authoritarianism than its evolution or nuances, the challenge of accounting for 
dynamics of change has been taken up in two extensive bodies of work that take a 
global perspective on such themes, those of Michael Mann and Charles Tilly. The 
latter’s relational regime model offers a particularly useful framework with which to 
approach the issue of authoritarian evolution in a global context.3 Tilly’s model sees 
both authoritarian and democratic regimes as variations on a spectrum combining at 
least four areas of relationship between states and populations: 
 
a) the degree of inclusivity of the ‘citizen’ category (breadth) 
b) the extent to which citizens are equal/unequal in relation to both each other 
and treated as such by the state (equality)  
c) the degree to which citizens are protected from arbitrary action from the state 
(protection) 
d) the extent to which there are mechanisms of binding consultation 
(consultation) 
 
At any one point in time a given regime can be characterized by how it conducts each 
of these relationships—how inclusive it is and the terms of that inclusion, comprising 
both issues of distribution and legal process; and the extent to which it is responsive 
to interests and demands of its population. The particular arrangements of each 
regime depend on its historical trajectory, on the balance of forces between social 
actors within it, and on the capacity of the state to enforce its authority. All of these 
factors are, naturally, liable to be influenced by external factors that could come under 
the heading of globalization, from war to trade to environmental change. At some 
point when a given regime conducts these four types of relationships towards the 
‘more’ end (more breadth, more equality, more protection and more consultation) we 
begin to describe them as democratic.  Yet the boundary between authoritarianism 
                                                       
3 This model is presented in a number of his works, but perhaps most succinctly in Charles Tilly, 
Democracy, Cambridge University Press (2007), pp.11-15. 
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and democracy conceived in these terms is fluid, and nations can de-democratize as 
well democratize while remaining in the zone of authoritarianism. 
 
The temporality inherent in Tilly’s model is particularly useful when considering the 
responses of authoritarian regimes to the challenges of globalization; in adapting to 
them regimes may become more inclusive or responsive in one area as a means of 
securing legitimation (both external or internal), whilst preserving authoritarian power 
in other areas. The model is also neutral as to causes—being more of a dynamic 
typology than a theory of regime types and change—which also allows us to use it in 
an open-ended way to develop and compare multiple causal hypothesis and broader 
theories. 
 
The paragraphs that follow explore some of the ways in which we can use Tilly’s 
model to think historically about the effects of globalization on authoritarian regimes. 
Yet, a word of warning—this cannot be taken as a comprehensive survey of History’s 
engagement with the questions of authoritarianism and of globalization, both 
extensive subjects of scholarship. Not even of the field of the history of 
authoritarianism and globalization which, although much smaller, is still wider than 
this short essay allows. Instead, as a way of example it explores two topics within 
globalization—internationalism and global migrations—seldom considered but 
relevant to contemporary authoritarianisms. 
 
Authoritarian internationalism 
 
Nationalism was a key axis for authoritarian legitimation and political mobilization in 
the 19th and 20th centuries, as it was for liberal, civic nationalism. It was also a 
political language that became quickly global, aided by the reach of European empires. 
But while nationalism is today understood as a transnational phenomenon, we have 
been perhaps slower at exploring the history of authoritarianism in a similar light. The 
universalism of democracy and the diffusion of democratic constitutionalism are well-
rehearsed topics, but the way in which authoritarian regime forms have crossed 
national boundaries and been adapted and transformed into local contexts is less well 
studied—with the possible exception of work on global dimensions of communism 
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and international socialism.  Examination ofhe question of what could be called 
“authoritarian internationalism” has been rare. 
 
Like other states, authoritarian regimes have had to negotiate their position and 
exchanges in a globalizing world. To do so, internationalism—understood as “an idea, 
a movement, or an institution that seeks to reformulate the nature of relations among 
nations through cross-national cooperation and exchange”—is not a strategy available 
exclusively to liberal regimes.4  The ‘top-down’ internationalism of the Cold War, 
where the international order of the two power blocs was of critical importance in 
creating, supporting and (in some cases) transforming authoritarian regimes in their 
orbit has been the subject of recent syntheses that also draw attention to the capacity 
of the periphery of the Cold War to influence developments in the “core”.5 But of 
increasing resonance in a multipolar world are cases of “horizontal internationalism” 
between authoritarian regimes. On one hand, this describes diplomatic and political 
interactions between regimes on a more even plane than the vertical influence of the 
global superpowers, as in the cases of the mid-20th century non-aligned movement or 
pan-Africanism. 6  On the other, it also describes a much broader transnational 
circulation of ideas, policies, and expertise between authoritarian states. 
 
This second mode of horizontal internationalism is as critical as the first when 
thinking about authoritarian adaptation and long-term survival. One area provides an 
apt example encompassing both issues of transnational diffusion and regime 
transformation—authoritarian social policy. A recent survey shows how, globally and 
historically, non-democratic regimes have most often been the first to introduce 
welfare systems in their territories.7 These include healthcare, pensions and other 
                                                       
4 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, Johns Hopkins University Press (1997), p.3. 
5 Greg Grandin, Empire's workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the rise of the new 
imperialism. Macmillan. (2006); Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, Vols 1 and 2, Cambridge University Press (2012); Odd Arne Westad, The 
global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our times. Cambridge University Press 
(2005); Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750, Basic Books (2012). 
6 Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Nada Boskovska (eds.):  The Non-Aligned Movement and the 
Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade (Routledge, 2014) 
7 Isabela Mares and Matthew E. Carnes. "Social policy in developing countries." Annual Review of 
Political Science 12 (2009): 93-113. For a survey of political and social sciences (lack of) engagement 
with the ‘authoritarian welfare state’ see Natalia Forrat, ‘The Authoritarian Welfare State: a 
Marginalized Concept’. Working Paper No. 12-005 (2012) CHSS Working Paper Series, the Roberta 
Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University, accessible at: 
http://www.bcics.northwestern.edu/documents/workingpapers/CHSS-12-005-Forrat.pdf  
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forms of social insurance or protection. The introduction of social policies by 
authoritarian regimes can expand the category of citizen, by covering new populations 
(Tilly’s dimension of breadth); it can alter the internal dynamics of relations between 
citizens (equality). Of course, authoritarian welfare systems can, and often are, used 
to generate new types of inequality, even as they include a broader proportion of the 
population and, in some cases, ameliorate the overall impact of social deprivation. For 
instance, authoritarian welfare systems can help legitimate and sustain authoritarian 
regimes, establishing clientelistic relations with that Partha Chatterjee has termed 
‘political society’ as opposed to the western liberal ideal of a ‘civil society’.8   
 
My own current research explores the transnational circulation of ideas, technologies, 
expertise and experts between authoritarian regimes in what could be called “Latin 
Atlantic” between 1930 and 1980—Brazil, Argentina, the Iberian countries and Italy 
(until the fall of Mussolini).9  Regimes in this transnational political and social space 
suffered significant transformations in this half century that took them through 
various forms of state-society relations that would be difficult to pin down to even 
rather sophisticated models of regime-type—personalism, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, military dictatorship, or populist presidentialism. It would be easy to 
get tied up in categorization and periodization of regime types without acknowledging 
fundamental continuities and evolutions in these regimes. One of the evolving 
features of these regimes was their construction of systems of welfare and economic 
management that, aside from specificities of regime type, evolved to condition state-
society relations and social inequalities throughout the middle of the 20th century, 
shaping legacies that have endured beyond democratization. Elsewhere I have argued 
that the development of systems of social citizenship combining influences from 
fascist corporatism and from international organizations partially account for the 
persistence of the Iberian authoritarianism in the second half of the 20th century.10 
 
                                                       
8 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World, 
Columbia University Press (2004) 
9 The international dimensions of fascism have been the subject of a few studies, the most recent being 
Federico Finchelstein, Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence and the Sacred in Argentina and 
Italy, 1919-1945, Duke University Press (2010) and David Aliano, Mussolini's National Project in 
Argentina, Farleigh Dickinson University Press (2012) 
10 Pedro Ramos Pinto ‘Everyday Citizenship under Authoritarianism: the cases of Spain and Portugal’, 
in Francesco Cavatorta (ed.) Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative 
Perspective (2012). 
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The key question my works follow is how the production of a form of authoritarian 
internationalism in this period shaped the evolution of the political regimes that 
connected to these global processes. The welfare regimes of countries in the “Latin 
Atlantic” have often been noted for their structural similarities.11 But the origins of 
these similarities lies not in a primordial shared culture, but in the way in which the 
countries in question were embedded in multiple global networks, not all of which 
were ‘authoritarian’. Besides the authoritarian internationalism mentioned above, they 
were also shaped in interaction with North America and Europe powers, or with 
international organizations, from the United Nations to the World Health 
Organization. Critically, however, these regimes engaged with them as authoritarian 
regimes albeit at a time (perhaps like now) when international organizations placed a 
low premium on democracy as a condition for membership or as a necessary part of 
development.12 
 
Authoritarianism and global migration 
 
Another topic linking the evolution of authoritarian regimes to transnational processes 
is global migration. In my own area of expertise, three features appear relevant. There 
is no doubt that Southern European dictatorships of the twentieth century relied on 
emigration as an escape valve for social tensions in their countries.  Officially illegal, 
migration was nevertheless tolerated as way of relieving unemployment and rural 
poverty and a welcome source of foreign currency in the form of remittances. Migrant 
communities (Portuguese in Brazil, Italians in Brazil and Argentina) were also 
important in supporting the kinds of transnational authoritarianism discussed above 
by creating local “chapters” devoted to the dissemination of authoritarian ideology. 
Yet, at the same time emigration was not without its risks: it was in some ways an 
exercise in ‘exit’, in Albert Hirschman’s sense of the term, that also revealed the 
failure of the regimes to address the problems that provoked. Migration is also rarely 
a one-way ticket, and returning migrants bring with them ideas, information, and 
expectations that can also be a challenge to authoritarian regimes.  
                                                       
11 Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens. Democracy and the left: social policy and inequality in Latin 
America. University of Chicago Press (2012). Jeremy Seekings, "Welfare regimes and redistribution in 
the South." In Ian Shapiro, Peter A. Swenson and Daniela Donno (eds.) Divide and Deal: The Politics 
of Distribution in Democracies, New York University Press (2008) 
12 Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil. Cornell 
University Press (1991). 
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Migration within and into nations controlled by authoritarian regimes is another 
important area to consider, namely bringing large populations under the jurisdiction 
of states that deny them the status (and rights) of citizenship. We can observe this in 
the contemporary Gulf States, but also in the Chinese hukou system of registration. 
Created in 1958 as a tool of development planning, hukou was a system that 
established categories of citizens with differentiated entitlements, in this case between 
rural and urban populations, and tied them to local systems of state provision 
(Benefits were more generous in the urban areas so as to reward managerial and 
skilled working-class workers). In the last twenty or so years, the explosion of rural to 
urban migration, tolerated and necessary, but not officially sanctioned, has left 
millions in the grey area of not being officially local citizens of the areas they moved 
to, and therefore unable to access welfare, housing, the legal system, and at the mercy 
of the authorities who often deport large groups back to the provinces when they 
become troublesome. In this case, Tilly’s dimensions of breadth and equality of 
citizenship came into play.   Inequality, initially designed by the Communist Chinese 
state to incorporate and gain the loyalty of professional and managerial groups, was 
overtime transformed into a system with different functions. After a rapprochement 
with the West in the 1970s, when China entered the global economy and re-directed 
its efforts towards export-led growth, the hukou was used to ensure that a growing 
industrial labor force would place only limited demands on the state by excluding 
them from more generous ‘urban’ rights. At the same time hukou was a means to 
control the industrial labor force, since troublemakers could always be removed from 
cities on account of not possessing the required residence permit, even as millions 
around them were tolerated for the sake of staffing China’s booming economy.13 
China has also recently announced sweeping reforms to the hukou system, which will 
make it easier for many to access urban citizenship, especially in smaller, mid-sized 
cities.14 These measures were to a large extent driven by the fear that growing 
                                                       
13 Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State and the 
Logic of the Market. Berkley: University of California Press (1999); Feng Wang, ‘Boundaries of 
Inequality: Perceptions of Distributive Justice Among Urbanites, Migrants, and Peasants’ Centre for 
the Study of Democracy Working Papers, UC Irvine (2007), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1v62q8pw 
[accessed 23 December 2014]. 
14 Charlotte Goodburn, ‘The end of the hukou system? Not yet’ University of Nottingham China Policy 
Institute Policy Papers 2014, No.2: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/policy-papers/cpi-
policy-paper-2014-no-2-goodburn.pdf [accessed 23 December 2014]. 
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inequality would undermine the regime’s legitimacy, but even as China expands the 
breadth of its most inclusive mode of citizenship and seeks to generate a degree of 
equality, party rule remains untouchable feature of the regime, at least for the time 
being. 
 
Closing remarks 
 
Looking at past instances of authoritarian internationalism or how longer histories of 
migration have affected authoritarian regimes are not a way to diminish the novelty of 
the challenges posed by contemporary processes of globalization. Yet neither does 
looking to the past interaction between local powers and global processes offer ready-
made models for their future development. But this exercise does help us understand 
the genealogies of present-day authoritarianism and how their nature has been 
influenced by past forms of engagement with global processes.  And, this may offer 
clues as to the ways they do so in the present. Perhaps most importantly, it directs our 
attention to the evolution of regimes in response to challenges — both internal and 
external — and towards analytical tools sensitive to such processes of change. 
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